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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STANDING-CONVEYANCE OF SUR-
PLUS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY To CHURCH-AFFILIATED COLLEGE.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
In August 1976 the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949,' conveyed seventy-seven acres of surplus gov-
ernment property,2 including buildings, fixtures, and equipment, to
the Valley Forge Christian College3 (Valley Forge) in Valley Forge,
Pennsylvania.' The Secretary of HEW, pursuant to federal regula-
tions,5 computed a 100 percent "public benefit allowance," which
permitted the petitioner to acquire the deed in fee simple with cer-
tain conditions subsequent 6 without making any financial payment
I. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Act authorizes the Secretary of
HEW (now the Secretary of Education) to dispose of surplus real property "for school, class-
room, or other educational use . I..." d  § 484(k)(1). The Secretary is authorized to sell or
lease the property to nonprofit, tax exempt educational institutions taking into account "any
benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the United States from the use of such property
. Id. § 484(k)(1)(A), (C).
2. The Act defines "surplus property" as "any excess property not required for the
needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal agencies, as determined by the
Administrator [of General Services]." Id. § 472(g) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. At the time of the conveyance, the petitioner was known as the Northeast Bible
College. The petitioner was a nonprofit educational institution operated by the Assemblies
of God "to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to men and women for Christian
service as either ministers or laymen." Faculty members were required to "have been bap-
tized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives." Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752, 756
(1982).
4. The property was part of a larger tract of 181 acres northwest of Philadelphia ac-
quired by the Department of the Army in 1942 and was the site of the Valley Forge General
Hospital until it was closed in 1973. Id.
The Supreme Court placed the value of the property when transferred at $577,500,
based on an appraisal which put no value on the buildings and fixtures on the property on
the assumption that "the expense necessary to render them useful for other purposes would
have offset the value of such an endeavor." Id. at n.7. The Third Circuit estimated the cost
of acquisition of the property at $10,374,386 and stated its fair value at the time of transfer to
be $1,303;730. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1980).
5. 34 C.F.R. § 12.9(a) (1981) provides for the computation of a public benefit allow-
ance "on the basis of benefits to the United States from the use of such property for educa-
tional purposes."
6. Valley Forge was required to use the property for thirty years solely for the educa-
tional purposes described in its application for the property. Those purposes were described
by the petitioner as "a program of education ... meeting the accrediting standards of the
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for it.
Upon learning of the conveyance through a news release,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.7 (Amer-
icans United) and four of its individual directors filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania. Americans United argued that the conveyance violated
the establishment clause8 of the first amendment. The respondents
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to void the conveyance and
force the petitioner to transfer the property back to the United
States government.
The district court granted summary judgment to Valley Forge
and dismissed the complaint.9 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the district court.'0 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari" and reversed the Third Circuit by a five to four vote.
The Court found that the respondent had suffered no actual injury
sufficient to confer standing as a taxpayer or as a citizen and held
that challenges under the establishment clause concerned rights
which were no more "fundamental" than those prescribed by any
State of Pennsylvania, The American Association of Bible Colleges, the Division of Educa-
tion of the General Council of the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration."
Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 756.
7. Americans United's purpose, as stated in its articles of incorporation, was "to de-
fend, maintain and promote religious liberty and the constitutional principle of the separa-
tion of church and state." Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. v.
United States Dep't of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1980). The respondent described
itself as a nonprofit organization composed of 90,000 "taxpayer members" who "would be
deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes
in violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion." Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 757.
8. U. S. CONST. amend. I states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
9. The court found, under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), that Americans United
lacked standing to sue as taxpayers and had failed to allege any actual injury "beyond a
generalized grievance common to all taxpayers." Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 757.
10. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United States Dep't
of HEW, 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit agreed that Americans United
lacked taxpayer standing under Flast but found that the respondents had standing as citizens
to challenge the conveyance as an "'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a
government that 'shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.'" Id. at 261.
Judge Rosen, concurring, expressed an additional reason: "[A]s a practical matter, no one is
better suited to bring this lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied in the Estab-
lishment Clause." Id. at 266. Judge Weis dissented. He agreed that the plaintiffs did not
have standing as taxpayers but found no injury in fact other than a "generalized grievance
• ..too abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of standing." Id. at 268-69 (citing
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
11. 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
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other constitutional provision. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S.
Ct. 752 (1982).
The power of the Supreme Court to review acts of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the federal government presents a
fundamental dilemma in a democratic society.12 Since Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,'3 the Court has generally
been reluctant to exercise its review power unless strictly necessary
to resolve concrete issues between adversary parties. 14 To imple-
ment this policy, the Court has fashioned procedural doctrines
designed to limit the circumstances under which the Court will in-
voke its "ultimate function" of reviewing the constitutionality of
acts of the coordinate branches of government.15
Standing differs from other procedural considerations by focus-
ing on the party bringing the lawsuit instead of on the issues being
presented.' 6 Whether viewed as a limitation imposed by article III
of the Constitution or as a rule of self-restraint, the doctrine of
standing to challenge governmental conduct in federal courts has
12. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
14, 83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. That the concept of
majority rule can be effectively undermined by unrestrained judicial activism is demon-
strated by the decisions of the Court between 1887 and 1937 which espoused the now dis-
credited doctrine of substantive due process. Id. at 385-450. The dilemma has generated
contrasting schools of thought regarding the proper role of the Court. Some judges and
constitutional scholars favor a strict view of judicial review, which should be exercised only
when absolutely necessary. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1978); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11-18 (1958); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES'
POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial
Function, 69 HARv. L. REV. 217 (1955); Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 19 (1969); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Other commentators and writers believe the judicial
function includes active protection of the constitutional rights of individuals. See, e.g., C.
BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, (1960); W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE
(1958); W. 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974); Wright, Professor Bickel, The
Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
13. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 83-85.
15. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56-80. These include doctrines
regarding advisory opinions, ripeness, mootness, collusive suits, political questions, and
standing. While usually identified as self-imposed rules of judicial restraint, these consider-
ations are also grounded in the language of article III of the Constitution, which provides
that the judicial power extends only to "cases and controversies." The line between those
considerations which are mandated by article III and those imposed by the Court itself has
seldom been clear, especially in the area of standing.
16. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
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been one of the most confused and confusing areas of the law.' 7
The law of standing prior to 1968 developed primarily around chal-
lenges based on asserted economic interests, and two principles were
discernible. 8 First, federal taxpayers did not have standing to sue
over the expenditure of tax dollars because their individual interest
in the revenues was deemed too remote and indirect to satisfy the
case or controversy requirement of article I1.19 Second, citizens
seeking redress as private parties for governmental action injurious
to their interests had to demonstrate the invasion of a "legal right"
to have standing to challenge the action.2°
The law concerning the standing of federal taxpayers appeared
to have been resolved in Frothingham v. Mellon,2 1 in which the
Court denied the plaintiff standing to challenge federal expenditures
alleged to violate the tenth amendment and the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.22 The Court held that the effect of federal
expenditures on an individual taxpayer was "so remote, fluctuating
and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preven-
17. The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has become an area of
incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears to have been
designed to supply retroactive satisfaction rather than future guidance. The Court
has itself characterized its law of standing as a 'complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction.' United States ex rel. Chapman v. F.P.C., 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18. Sedler. Standing, Justiciability andAll That. A BehavioralAnalysis, 25 VAN. L. REV.
479, 482 (1972).
19. Massachusetts v. Mellon/Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
20. L. Singer and Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295 (1940); Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); City of Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939); Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2nd Cir.
1943), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See Scott, Standing In The Supreme Court-A
FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
21. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Frothingham was decided with the companion case of Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, id. Prior to 1923, the Supreme Court had occasionally heard taxpayer
challenges to federal disbursements. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) (Court reached the
merits of a federal taxpayer suit to enjoin expenditures for building the Panama Canal);
Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) (Court assumed, without deciding, that a taxpayer of
the District of Columbia could challenge the expenditure of public funds to improve private
railroad grade crossings); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (Court decided a federal
taxpayer challenge to payments to a District of Columbia hospital on the merits). See gener-
ally Davis, Standing.- Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 634 (1967-68).
The ability of state and municipal taxpayers to challenge the validity of local expendi-
tures is well established. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Crampton v.
Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1880). But cf. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952)
(taxpayer challenge to reading of Bible verses in school dismissed as not justiciable).
22. The plaintiff in Frothingham challenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of
1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921), as an invasion of a sphere reserved to the states under the
tenth amendment and as a deprivation of her property without due process of law. 262 U.S.
at 479-80.
tive powers of a court of equity. ' 23 Frothingham defined the law
regarding federal taxpayers' suits until 1968, when Flast v. Cohen24
was decided.
In Flast the Court held that Frothingham was not an absolute
constitutional barrier to taxpayer suits. The Court recognized
standing in a taxpayer's action to challenge the expenditure of fed-
eral funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
196525 as a violation of the establishment clause.26 The focus was on
the party, not on the issue; the party was required to demonstrate a
"personal stake in the outcome" to insure the "concrete adverse-
ness" necessary to adjudication of constitutional issues .2  The Court
examined the substantive issues, not on the merits, but "to deter-
mine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted
and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 28
The nexus test had two parts: first, the taxpayer was required to
establish that the challenged expenditure exceeded congressional
authority under the taxing and spending clause of article I, section 8
of the Constitution;29 second, the taxpayer was required to show
that the challenged expenditure contravened a specific constitu-
tional limitation on the power to tax and spend and "not simply that
the enactment [was] generally beyond the powers delegated to Con-
gress by Art. I, § 8."30 The Court in Flast found that the establish-
ment clause was specifically intended by the framers of the
Constitution to prevent the use of the taxing and spending power to
support religion and held that the plaintiffs met the nexus require-
ments.3' - While the Flast case arose in the context of a challenge
23. 262 U.S. at 487.
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241, 821 (1976). The plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expendi-
ture of funds to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious
schools. 392 U.S. at 85-86.
26. 392 U.S. at 105-06.
27. Id. at 99-101 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
28. Id. at 102.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 103. See also Bogen, Standing Up For Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing
To Raise Constitutional Issues, 67 Ky. L. J. 147, 148-53 (1978-79); Tushnet, The New Law of
Standing: 4 Plea For Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 688-90 (1977).
31. 392 U.S. at 103. The Court distinguished Frothingham on the basis that neither the
tenth amendment nor the due process clause of the fifth amendment were specific limitations
on the spending and taxing power. Therefore, the plaintiff in Frothingham failed the second
part of the nexus requirement. In Flast the nexus requirement was deemed to satisfy article
III's "case or controversy" requirement by providing "the necessary specificity,. . . adverse-
ness and. . . vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form tradi-
tionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution." Id. at 106. Before Flast, of course,
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under the establishment clause, the Court did not limit its holding to
that provision,32  and the potential for taxpayer suits under other
constitutional provisions was apparent.
During the period between Frothingham and Flast, the law of
nontaxpayer or "citizen" standing had focused on the "legal right"
or "legal interest" test 33 which had become "the dominant pruden-
tial limitation on federal standing" prior to 1970.14 A private party
had to demonstrate a direct harm to a "legally protected interest" to
support a cause of action or a right to sue.35 However, the legal
interest test was not uniformly applied,36 and in the same year Flast
was decided, the Supreme Court significantly modified it in Hardin
v. Kentucky Utilities Co. 37 Flast and Hardin expanded the tradi-
tional view of standing and provided a broader base for challenges
to government action by private parties as citizens or as taxpayers.
Two years later, the Supreme Court discarded the "legal inter-
est" test altogether. In Association of Data Processing Service Orga-
nizations v. Camp38 the Court held that sellers of data processing
services had standing to contest a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Frothingham stood for the proposition that taxpayer suits were not a form of constitutional
challenge traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution.
32. Id. at 105.
33. See cases cited supra note 20.
The principle [that one threatened with direct injury as a result of a statute author-
izing violation of legal rights may challenge the validity of the statute] is without
application unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). See generally Scott, Stand-
ing In The Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973).
34. Marquis, The Zone of Interests Component ofthe Federal Standing Rules.- Alive and
WellAfter All?, 4 UALR L.J. 261, 263 (1981).
35. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
36. Compare FCC v. NBC (KOA), 349 U.S. 239 (1943); Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC,
346 U.S. 4 (1942); and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) with cases
cited supra note 20.
37. 390 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court held that a private utility had standing to challenge
the TVA's sale of electric power to towns served by the plaintiff when the sales contravened a
1959 statute designed "to protect private utilities from TVA competition." ld. at 6. This
holding largely discredited prior law, which had held that a competitive interest alone was
not sufficient to confer standing. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225
F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (referred to in Hardin, 390 U.S. at 7
n.7); see also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 450-52 (1969-
70).
38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The case was brought under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 702 of that Act provides: "A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected. . . within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review."
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Currency which permitted national banks to provide computer serv-
ices to customers and other banks 9.3  The Court articulated a two-
pronged approach to citizen standing: (1) there must be "injury in
fact, economic or otherwise,' 40 and (2) the interest sought to be pro-
tected must be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." 4'
That the "zone of interests" prong was to be liberally applied
was demonstrated in Barlow v. Collins,42 the companion case to Data
Processing. In Barlow the Court found that tenant farmers had
standing to challenge the economic injury caused by a federal regu-
lation which relieved the farmers of prior restrictions on the assign-
ment of government payments.43 Although this application of the
"zone of interests" approach was a liberal one, Justices Brennan and
White dissented from the majority's treatment of the standing ques-
tion and argued that, after Flast, standing should turn solely on the
existence of "injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 44
The most expansive application of the zone of interests formu-
lation came in United States v. SCRAP,45 in which the Court held
that an ad hoc group of law students had standing to challenge an
Interstate Commerce Commission railroad rate increase. The in-
crease was alleged to result in the diversion of natural resources out
of the locale and "economic, recreational and aesthetic harm." 46
The Court recognized the "attenuated line of causation to the even-
tual injury" but found the allegations, if proved, sufficient to meet
39. The Court rejected the legal interest test as too strongly implicating the merits.
"The question of standing is different." 397 U.S. at 153.
40. Id. at 152.
41. Id. at 153.
42. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 590h(g) (1976) allowed farmers to assign payments only "as security for
cash or advances to finance making a crop." The challenged regulation defined "making a
crop" to include assignments to secure rent payments, permitting the farmers to do some-
thing previously prohibited. 7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1982). The farmers' challenge was based on
the contention that landlords could compel them to finance all their farm needs from the
landlords at high interest rates. 397 U.S. at 160-63.
44. 397 U.S. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In an opinion addressed to both Data
Processing and Barlow, Justices Brennan and White argued that the determination of injury
in fact provided the "personal stake in the outcome" and "necessary adverseness" to meet
the case or controversy requirements of article III and that no further inquiry was "perti-
nent." Id. at 172-73. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450,
457 (1969-70).
45. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). SCRAP stands for Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures.
46. Id. at 675-76.
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the injury in fact standard.47 Thus, in the five years from 1968 to
1973, the Supreme Court had recognized an exception to the Froth-
ingham barrier to taxpayer suits, modified and then discarded the
legal interest test, and substituted a zone of interests formulation
which, in its application, was often indistinguishable from the injury
in fact approach suggested by Justices Brennan and White.48
About the same time SCRAP was decided, the Court began to
limit the broad ramifications of Data Processing and Barlow by em-
phasizing causation as a necessary component of standing. 49 The
process had begun three months prior to SCRAP in Linda R.S v.
Richard D. 50 In Linda the mother of an illegitimate child alleged
discriminatory prosecutions under a Texas statute which made the
failure to pay child support a crime." The statute had been con-
strued by the Texas courts as applying only to married parents.5 2
The Court denied the plaintiff standing, finding that the relief
sought would not redress the claimed injury because it would not
result in support payments to the mother, but only in the incarcera-
tion of the father.5 3 Since the injury would not be redressed by en-
forcement of the statute, it was considered too remote to be
justiciable. 54
The focus on causation was further developed in two cases in-
volving challenges by groups of indigents and others to a zoning
ordinance 55 and an Internal Revenue Service ruling56 claimed to
deny suitable housing and hospital services to the poor. In Warth v.
47. Id. at 688-90. The year before SCR,4P, the Court, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972), found general allegations of a "public interest" in the "conservation and the
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests" by "a large and long-
established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation's
natural heritage" insufficient to warrant standing to challenge construction of a proposed
road through a National Park. Id. at 730, 739. The SCRAP Court distinguished Sierra
Club on the adequacy of the pleadings. 412 U.S. at 687-90.
48. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 291-94 (1958 & Supp. 1982).
49. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See also Recent Standing Cases anda Possible Alternative
Approach, 27 HASTINGS L. J. 213 (1975-76).
50. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
51. Id. at 615.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 618-19.
54. Id. at 618.
55. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
56. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
[Vol. 5:439
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Seldin57 the Court emphasized the necessity of pleading causation
in terms of the ability of the requested relief to remove the chal-
lenged barriers.5 8 The Court viewed the redressability of the claims
as a guideline to whether the needed causation was established. 9
This requirement was deemed in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization60 to define the constitutional demands of article
III for a case or controversy. 6' Subsequent cases found standing in
situations similar to that in Warth when the allegations were suffi-
ciently specific to indicate that judicial intervention could provide
relief from the challenged conduct.
62
The liberalizing effect of Data Processing was obscured by this
use of redressability to evaluate causation as an article III standing
requirement.63 At about the same time, the Court decided two cases
which placed renewed emphasis on the separation of powers by re-
fusing to hear generalized grievances based on the assertion that
government conduct was unconstitutional. 64  United States v. Rich-
ardson65 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War
66
made it clear that Flast would be narrowly construed,67 and that
57. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
58. Id. at 501-02. The petitioners brought an action against the town of Penfield, N.Y.,
claiming the town's zoning ordinance, as written and as enforced, excluded low to moderate
income persons from living in Penfield, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
59. 422 U.S. at 504-05.
60. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Low income individuals and organizations sued the Secretary of
the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue to challenge Rev. Rul. 69-545, which
extended favorable tax treatment to hospitals that did not extend certain services to indi-
gents. The ruling was also claimed to violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
61. 426 U.S. at 38, 41-42.
62. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
63. See the analysis of the redressability issue in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court found that the environmental injuries
complained of were fairly traceable to the limitations on liability of the Price-Anderson Act
because its legislative history indicated the construction of private nuclear facilities would
not have taken place as it did "but for" the Act. The Court determined that the injuries
asserted were likely to be redressed by a decision favorable to the plaintiffs. Id. at 72-81.
64. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
65. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
66. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
67. From 1968 to 1974 the Supreme Court occasionally cited Flast for general proposi-
tions of standing, but did not directly apply its nexus test. The lower courts, however, used
the Flast rule to deny standing in a variety of taxpayer cases. See, e.g., Velvel v. Nixon, 415
F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp.
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standing would remain a significant barrier to citizen challenges to
the conduct of government. 68
In Richardson the plaintiff sought information about the annual
expenditures of the CIA69 and asked the district court to declare the
Central Intelligence Agency Act 70 unconstitutional as a violation of
the accounts clause. 7' The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff had
standing under Flast, finding a sufficient nexus between his taxpayer
status and the failure to report CIA expenditures, and determining
that the accounts clause was a specific limitation on the congres-
sional power to tax and spend.72 The Supreme Court reversed and
denied standing.73 The Court found neither prong of the Flast test
satisfied74 and emphasized the narrowness of Flast's holding.75
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War arose
under the incompatibility clause76 of the Constitution. The plain-
tiffs sought a declaration that this provision was violated by mem-
bers of Congress who held commissions in the armed forces
reserves.77 Standing was asserted as taxpayers and as citizens.78
1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United
States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
68. In Richardson the Court addressed the requirement of citizen standing as "a direct
injury" which the party "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining." 418 U.S.
at 177-78 (quoting Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)). Furthermore, the injury must
be more than "generalized grievance[s] about the conduct of government." 418 U.S. at 175
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
69. 418 U.S. at 167-68.
70. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
71. U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 provides: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treas-
ury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time."
72. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972).
73. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
74. The Court deemed Richardson's challenge addressed, not to the taxing or spending
power, but to a congressional statute regulating the CIA. Id. at 175. In addition, the Court
found "no claim that appropriations were being spent in violation of a 'specific constitu-
tional limitation on the . . . taxing and spending power ... '" since Richardson only
sought information concerning how funds were spent. Id.
75. The Court stated that while Flast had "slightly lowered" the Frothingham barrier to
taxpayer suits, it remained clear that Frothingham still precluded hearing "generalized griev-
ances." Id. at 173.
76. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
77. 418 US. 208, 210-11 (1974).
78. Id. at 211-12.
The Supreme Court summarily rejected the claim of taxpayer stand-
ing on the authority of Fast9 but dealt with the claim of citizen
standing more extensively.80 The Court found the claimed injury to
be "abstract" and held that when only the generalized interest of all
citizens in constitutional governance is involved, the "concrete ad-
verseness" necessary for "authoritative presentations" of claims is
lacking.8' The Court's denial of citizen standing was also predicated
on the need to refrain from unnecessary "constitutional adjudica-
tion, the most important and delicate of its responsibilities. 8 2
By 1980 the potential for liberal application of the Data
Processing-Barlow standards seemed to have been greatly dimin-
ished by the Richardson and Schlesinger decisions. In that year,
however, the Court heard a challenge to a district court ruling in the
absence of any showing of actual injury to the plaintiffs.8 3 In Bryant
v. Yellen 84 the Court recognized standing without considering either
the "zone of interests" or the redressability of the claims presented.
Instead, the Court simply concluded that residents of Imperial Val-
ley, California, who desired to purchase farmlands in the valley had
standing to pursue an appeal challenging a district court's decision
that section 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 19265 did not
impose acreage limitations on landowners who already had vested
or present rights to Colorado River waters.8 6 The Court held "that
respondents had a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy
to afford them standing" because it was "unlikely that any of the
800 owners of excess lands would sell land at below current market
price absent the applicability of § 46 and it being likely that excess
lands would become available at less than market price if § 46 were
79. Id. at 227-28.
80. Id. at 216-27.
81. Id. at 218-21.
82. Id. at 221.
83. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
84. 447 U.S. 352 (1980). The case was originally filed by the United States for a declar-
atory judgment that the provisions of § 46 of the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, 43
U.S.C. § 423e (1976), which limited irrigation water deliveries from reclamation projects to
160 acres under single ownership, applied to all private lands in the Imperial Irrigation
District whether or not they had vested or present rights to Colorado River waters. When
the district court ruled against the United States, residents of the Valley were allowed to
intervene and pursue the appeals process in place of the United States. The residents
wanted § 46 to apply to the District because, if the section applied, excess lands might be-
come available for purchase below market value for irrigated land.
85. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1976).




The diversity of the Supreme Court's standing decisions paved
the way for the Third Circuit's determination that Americans
United had standing to challenge HEW's conveyance of property to
Valley Forge Christian College. However, the Supreme Court in
Valley Forge rejected the idea that Americans United had suffered
any injury which presented a "case or controversy" sufficient to con-
fer standing to pursue the action.88 The emphasis was on the consti-
tutional mandate of article III, couched in terms of the judicial
power, not as "an unconditioned authority to determine the consti-
tutionality of legislative or executive acts," but as "legitimate only in
the last resort . in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy."89
While conceding that confusion exists regarding which features
of the standing doctrine are constitutionally required and which are
imposed by the Court for its own governance,9" the Court consid-
ered that the recent line of decisions had identified the "irreducible
minimum" of article III requirements for standing.9' A party is re-
quired to "show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct" 92 and
that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and
"is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." 93 The Court said
the existence of an actual injury redressable by the court was the
87. Id. at 368. Despite the respondents' failure to plead financial capacity to buy the
land, the Court stated "the absence of detailed information about respondents' financial
resources does not defeat respondents' claim of standing." Id. at 367 n.17. The Court in
Bryant distinguished Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), by saying
[wihile the prospect of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential
purchasers of the excess lands, respondents' interest is not 'shared in substantially
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens,' Warth v. Seldin, because respon-
dents are residents of the Imperial Valley who desire to purchase the excess land
for purposes of farming.
447 U.S. at 367 n.17 (citation omitted).
88. 102 S. Ct. at 752.
89. Id. at 758 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
90. The term "standing" subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and pru-
dential considerations, see Warth v. Se/din, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), and it has not
always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the
"standing" requirement have been required by Art. III ex proprio vigore, or
whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not
compelled by the language of the Constitution. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 97.
102 S. Ct. at 758.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 758.
92. Id. (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
93. Id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)).
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only appropriate circumstance for exercise of the Court's power to
review the constitutionality of acts of the coequal branches of the
government.9
4
The Court initially reviewed Americans United's complaint as
a taxpayer suit and, relying on Frothingham, said that the alleged
unconstitutional expenditure of public funds was not a sufficient in-
jury to confer standing.95 Moving to an evaluation under the Flast
nexus test, the Court distinguished Flast by saying that Americans
United failed the first prong of the nexus test in two respects: 96 first,
the claim was directed at an executive rather than a congressional
action, 97 and second, the property transfer did not occur as an exer-
cise of the taxing and spending power, but pursuant to the property
clause of article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution.98
The Court commented that "[any doubt that once might have
existed concerning the rigor with which the Flast exception to the
Frothingham principle ought to be applied should have been erased
by this Court's recent decisions in United States v. Richardson and
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop The War."'99 The
Court's determination that the respondent lacked taxpayer standing
was apparently in accord with the court of appeals' decision.1°°
94. Id. at 759. The Court also identified a set of prudential principles bearing on
standing:
[T]his Court has held that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499. In addition, even when the plain-
tiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the
Court has refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance" which amount to "generalized grievances," pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches. Id. at 499-500. Finally,
the Court has required that the plaintiffs complaint fall within "the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1969) [sic].
102 S. Ct. at 759-60 (footnotes omitted).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 761. The Court also relied on Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429
(1952).
96. 102 S. Ct. at 762.
97. Id. The source of the complaint was held to be the decision by HEW to transfer a
parcel of federal property rather than the congressional authorization of such transfers con-
tained in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. For a different
view, see id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. U. S. CoNsT., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Reg-
ulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
99. 102 S. Ct. at 763 (citations omitted).
100. The Third Circuit had stated:
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The Supreme Court differed with the lower court on the issue
of plaintifis standing as citizens, however. The Court did not accept
the appeals court's determination that the establishment clause cre-
ates in each citizen a "'personal constitutional right' to a govern-
ment that does not establish religion."'' ° The Court specifically
rejected the idea that the establishment clause was in any way more
fundamental than the accounts or incompatibility clauses, or dimin-
ished the article III requirement for standing. 10 2 In the Court's
view, the "generalized grievance" raised in Valley Forge shared the
common deficiency of Schlesinger and Richardson -no personal in-
jury. 103 The Court denied standing as citizens and reversed the
judgment of the lower court.l4
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Black-
mun, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for ignoring the sub-
stantive issues and dealing only with the threshold problem of
standing.0 5 Justice Brennan asserted that article III "was designed
to provide a hospitable forum in which persons enjoying rights
under the Constitution could assert those rights."' s
Inasmuch as litigants suing in the capacity of taxpayers must show that the activity
in question involves substantial taxing and spending, it may well be that the plain-
tiffs here lack taxpayer standing. We do question, however, the assumption by the
district court that the only basis advanced by the plaintiffs ...is, or must be,
alleged injury to their interest as taxpayers.
Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United States Dep't. of
HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original).
101. 102 S. Ct. at 764. (quoting, Americans United For Separation of Church and State,
Inc. v. United States Dep't. of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980)).
102. Id. The Court said, "we know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy
of constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might permit
respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States." Id. at 765 (footnote
omitted).
103. Id. at 765.
104. Id. at 767-68.
105. Id. at 768. While recognizing that standing is a jurisdictional matter for article III
courts, Justice Brennan noted that there "is an impulse to decide difficult questions of sub-
stantive law" only on that basis. The dissent cited Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975),
for the proposition that the existence of an article III injury often turned "on the nature and
source of the claim asserted." 102 S. Ct. at 769. According to Justice Brennan the Court
"waxes eloquent" on "our misguided 'standing' jurisprudence" but "not one word is said
about the Establishment Clause right that the plaintijTseeks to enforce." 102 S. Ct. at 768
(emphasis in original).
106. 102 S. Ct. at 770. Compare Justice Rehnquist's comment for the majority:
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires
neither that the judicial branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two
coequal branches of the federal government, nor that it hospitably accept for adju-
dication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where
the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury.
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The dissent characterized the reasoning of Frothingham as "ob-
scure" 10 7 and identified its unstated premise as a conviction that a
federal taxpayer has no continuing legal interest in the affairs of the
Treasury. 108
Justice Brennan viewed the Flast decision as recognizing a di-
rect interest of taxpayers in government expenditures claimed to vi-
olate the establishment clause. 109 The nexus test "sought to
maintain necessary continuity with prior cases"'" 0 but "did not de-
part from the principle that no judgment about standing should be
made without a fundamental understanding of the rights at is-
sue.""' The dissent found Valley Forge indistinguishable from
Flast and criticized the distinctions made by the majority. ' 2 The
appellants in Flast also challenged the action of HEW (found to be
"executive" by the majority) in disbursing funds pursuant to con-
gressional authorization," 3 and the majority's distinction between
the spending clause and the property clause failed to recognize that
a complaint concerning "distribution of government largesse" met
"the essential requirement of taxpayer standing" in Doremus v.
Id. at 759.
107. Id. at 771. Justice Brennan stated:
The question apparently remains open whether Frothingham stated a prudential
limitation or identified an Article III barrier . . . . Perhaps the case is most use-
fully understood as a 'substantive' declaration of the legal rights of a taxpayer with
respect to government spending, coupled with a prudential restriction on the tax-
payer's ability to raise the claims of third parties.
Id. at n.8 (citations omitted).
108. The Frothingham bar to taxpayer suits was deemed to have given way to the estab-
lishment clause challenge in Flast because the Court had previously recognized that provi-
sion as a "definite restriction on the power to tax." 102 S. Ct. at 773 (footnote omitted).
After citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1898), Justice Brennan concluded that "/t]he taxpayer was the direct and intended
beneficiary of the prohibition on financial aid to religion." 102 S. Ct. at 775 (emphasis in
original).
109. 102 S. Ct. at 776-77.
It is at once apparent that the test of standing formulated by the Court in Flast
sought to reconcile the developing doctrine of taxpayer "standing" with the Court's
historical understanding that the Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit
the Federal Government from using tax funds for the advancement of religion, and
thus the constitutional imperative of taxpayer standing in certain cases brought
pursuant to the Establishment Clause.
d. at 777.
110. Particularly Frothingham and Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
111. 102 S. Ct. at 777 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
113. The difference in result may be attributable (as is not uncommon in standing deci-
sions) to the adequacy of the pleadings. 102 S. Ct. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Board of Education !4 whether it concerned a grant of cash or
property. " 15
Justice Stevens dissented separately because the plaintifis invo-
cation of the establishment clause in Flast v. Cohen was "of decisive
importance in resolving the standing issue in that case.""' 6
The jurisprudence of standing has been announced in many in-
consistent and wide-ranging Supreme Court decisions. If anything
is discernible about these decisions, it is the reluctance of the Court
to resolve the issue solely on the basis of an injury in fact, presuma-
bly because it too strongly implicates the merits. Perhaps that is
why the Court has fashioned a second "prong" to the standing de-
termination, sometimes identified as a "prudential" considera-
tion." '7 The difficulty of consistent application of these undefined
criteria is evidenced by the Court's disregard of the tests it
announces. 1
8
If the nexus test of Flast has lowered the procedural barriers to
standing in taxpayer or citizen suits, it appears to have done so only
slightly. Flast ushered in a decade of widely divergent standing de-
cisions, devoid of any unifying principle. Valley Forge may prove to
be simply one of that genre, but it is hard to escape the conclusion
that therein lies an implicit constitutional judgment which consti-
tutes a major repudiation of Flast.
As Justice Stevens so aptly pointed out in his dissent in Valley
Forge, it is hard to read the majority and concurring opinions in
Flast without concluding that the Court viewed the fact that the
challenge arose under the establishment clause of "decisive impor-
tance.," '9 The Valley Forge Court distinguished Flast by suggesting
dual reasons why Americans United failed the first prong of the
nexus test. 2 ° The assertion that there was no injury because only
114. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
115. 102 S. Ct. at 779 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 780.
117. At various times the Court has spoken in terms of "redressability," Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); "causation," Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); "zone of interests," Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); "nexus," Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); and "legal rights," Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S.
118 (1939).
118. For instance, Professor Davis reports that from 1970 to 1982 there have been 30
major decisions on standing. Only five of those decisions have mentioned the "zone" test of
Data Processing. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00 (Supp. 1982).
119. 102 S. Ct. at 780.
120. Id. at 762. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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executive, not congressional, action was involved can be understood
only as a highly technical consideration based on the pleadings,
since the plaintiffs in Flast also challenged HEW disbursements.' 2'
So, too, the premise that the property clause may legitimately au-
thorize a disposition of property potentially violative of the first
amendment is untenable. 122 Resolving the constitutional issue by
summarily finding no "injury of any kind,"'' 23 the Court has neces-
sarily made a determination of the scope of establishment clause
protections.
If the rule of Flast retains any vitality after Valley Forge, it will
probably do so only in fact situations so identical to Flast as to be
simply indistinguishable from it. What is most unfortunate about
Valley Forge is that the substantive issue is subordinated to the con-
fused and misunderstood rubric of standing doctrine. Even if it be
determined that the establishment clause was not meant to reach the
conveyance involved here, the substantive issues should have been
considered.
Despite indications to the contrary in Valley Forge, it remains
hard to believe that the concept of separation of church and state
embodied in the first amendment was of no more importance to the
framers of the Constitution than provisions prohibiting the holding
of dual offices by members of Congress or providing for public
statements of federal expenditures.
Thomas J. O'Hern
121. The plaintiffs challenged the actions of HEW officials under the Elementary and
Secondary School Act of 1965. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 87 (1968). They claimed that
the expenditures to religious schools were either not authorized by the Act or, if they were,
that the Act was unconstitutional. Id. In Valley Forge the respondents challenged the HEW
action in transferring the property, but did not specifically seek a declaration that the Fed-
eral Property and Administrative Services Act was unconstitutional. 102 S. Ct. at 778 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
122. See 102 S. Ct. at 780-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
115-16 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
123. Id. at 766 (emphasis in original).
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